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THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE IN NEW
MEXICO: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
LOREN FOY*
INTRODUCTION
The tragedy giving rise to the 2008 Federal District Court of New Mexico case,
Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., first began when, at the age of sixty-eight, Gilbert
Rimbert’s wife of forty-two years, Olivia, informed him that she wanted a divorce.1
After Gilbert received this unsettling news, Gilbert developed feelings of despondence and depression and consulted his primary care physician, Dr. Hochstadt, for
help.2
Gilbert first met with Dr. Hochstadt regarding his depression on August 18,
2003, at which time Dr. Hochstadt evaluated the severity of Gilbert’s symptoms
and concluded that Gilbert was suffering from moderate depression.3 Based on this
conclusion, Dr. Hochstadt prescribed Gilbert with a twenty milligram daily dose of
Fluoxetine, the generic equivalent of Prozac.4 Dr. Hochstadt then cautioned Gilbert regarding the increased risk of suicidality associated with the use of SSRIs5
and requested that Gilbert return for a follow-up visit in three to four weeks.6
When Gilbert returned for his follow-up appointment, he reported that he had
not noticed any dramatic improvements in his overall mood.7 Based on this report,
Dr. Hochstadt increased Gilbert’s daily dose of Fluoxetine from twenty milligrams
to forty milligrams, and again cautioned Gilbert to contact his office if he experienced any thoughts of suicide or worsening depression.8 Dr. Hochstadt then instructed Gilbert that he wanted to see him back in his office for a follow-up
appointment in two months.9
Gilbert never made that appointment.
On the morning of September 25, 2003, Gilbert shot and killed his wife Olivia,
the family dog, and himself.10 When the police arrived at the Rimbert’s home, they
found Gilbert seated at the kitchen table next to a bottle marked “Prozac.”11 The
toxicological examination indicated that at the time of the shooting Gilbert had
Fluoxetine in his system.12

* Loren Foy, University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.
1. CIV 06-0874, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68851, at *3–4 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009).
2. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179 (D.N.M. 2008) (predicting the New Mexico
Supreme Court would reject the learned intermediary doctrine, the court granted in part and denied in part
Eli Lilly’s Motion for Summary Judgment), modified, No. CIV 06-0874, slip op. (D.N.M. Nov. 16, 2009) (denying Rimbert’s Motion for a New Scheduling Order and granting Eli Lilly’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Based on Lack of Admissible Expert Testimony), appeal docketed, No. 09-2307 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1180. For information about selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), a class of antidepressants used to treat depression, see Alexandre Y. Dombrovski & Richard H. Lindner, Recognizing and
Dealing with Depression, 32 PENN. LAW. 18, 24 (2010).
6. Eli Lilly & Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68851, at *5.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *6.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *7.
11. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1183 (D.N.M. 2008) (noting that the bottle found
at the scene was labeled “Prozac” but had no other identifying information linking the bottle to Gilbert).
12. Id.
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Gilbert’s son, Mark Rimbert, filed “a products liability, personal injury, and
wrongful death suit against Eli Lilly, the [manufacturer] of Prozac,” alleging that,
had Eli Lilly provided Gilbert with an adequate warning, the three deaths could
have been avoided.13
Eli Lilly responded by asserting the learned intermediary doctrine as an affirmative defense.14 The learned intermediary doctrine is an exception to the doctrine
of strict products liability and requires drug manufacturers to warn the prescribing
physicians, instead of the ultimate consumers, of the possible dangers posed by the
use of a particular drug.15 Thus, under the learned intermediary doctrine a manufacturer is able to insulate itself from liability in a failure-to-warn claim, so long as
it provides the physician with an adequate warning.16
Although New Mexico has never expressly adopted the learned intermediary
doctrine by name, the essence of the doctrine has been consistently applied by the
New Mexico Court of Appeals for over forty years when addressing failure-towarn claims in the prescription drug context. However, in the 2008 case Rimbert v.
Eli Lilly & Co., the Federal District Court of New Mexico determined that, despite
the apparent adoption of the doctrine by multiple New Mexico Court of Appeals’
decisions, the learned intermediary doctrine was “fundamentally inconsistent”
with New Mexico’s strict liability jurisprudence.17 It is based on this conclusion that
the court predicted that, if presented with the issue today, the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the doctrine in its entirety.18
This note evaluates the soundness of the Rimbert decision, with particular emphasis on Judge Browning’s conclusion that the validity of the learned intermediary doctrine did not warrant certification to the New Mexico Supreme Court. In
Part I, this note provides a general overview of the learned intermediary doctrine
and examines the history of the learned intermediary doctrine within New Mexico’s caselaw. Part II evaluates the Rimbert court’s prediction that, if presented
with the issue today, the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the learned
13. Eli Lilly & Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68851, at *8.
14. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
15. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1097 (2010). Strict products liability imposes a duty on the
manufacturer of a product to directly warn consumers of the risks associated with the use of its product. 72A
C.J.S. Products Liability § 7 (2004). The purpose of the doctrine is “to ensure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by manufacturers and sellers as a cost of doing business, rather than by
injured persons.” Id.
16. See Richards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 678–69, 625 P.2d 1192, 1195–96 (Ct. App. 1980). The
court in Upjohn provided five criteria that courts must examine when determining whether a manufacturer’s
warning is adequate: (1) the scope of danger within the warning; (2) whether the warning reasonably communicates the extent or seriousness of the harm that could result from a misuse of the drug; (3) whether the
physical aspects of the warning itself are such that a reasonably prudent person would be put on notice; (4)
whether the warning indicates the consequences that might result from a failure to follow the warning; (5)
whether the means used to convey the warning were adequate. Id. at 679; 625 P.2d at 1196; see also 63A AM.
JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1097 (2010).
17. 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1215. The Rimbert court relied on the New Mexico Supreme Court opinion,
Brooks v. Beech Aircraft, which held:
Although the manufacturer has provided a valuable service by supplying the public with a
product that it wants or needs, it is more fair that the cost of an unreasonable risk of harm
lie with the product and its possibly innocent manufacturer than it is to visit the entire loss
upon the often unsuspecting consumer who has relied upon the expertise of the manufacturer when selecting the injury-producing product.
Id. at 1201 (citing Brooks v. Beech Aircraft, 120 N.M. 372, 375–76, 902 P.2d 54, 57–58 (1995)).
18. See id. at 1215.
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intermediary doctrine. Part III reviews the Rimbert court’s interpretation of New
Mexico’s certification rules. Finally, Part IV examines the procedural and substantive implications of the Rimbert decision and suggests that, when addressing failure-to-warn claims in the future, the New Mexico courts should adopt a case-bycase approach in determining whether a manufacturer should benefit from the
learned intermediary doctrine.
I. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE
The learned intermediary doctrine permits a manufacturer to discharge its duty
to warn of the risks associated with the use of its product and to insulate itself from
liability in a failure-to-warn claim by providing a physician with an adequate warning.19 Therefore, under the doctrine, it is the physician, not the manufacturer, that
must inform his or her patients of the risks associated with the use of any prescribed medication.20 In a failure-to-warn claim, this typically results in the patient
only being able to recover damages from the physician, as it is the physician, not
the manufacturer, who bears the burden of warning the patient of the risks associated with the use of a particular medication.21
A. History of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
The learned intermediary doctrine was first conceptualized by the New York
Supreme Court in its 1948 case, Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals.22 In that case,
the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer failed to provide consumers with adequate information regarding the risks associated with the manufacturer’s medication.23 In addressing the plaintiff’s claim, the New York Supreme Court
distinguished between prescription and non-prescription medications and held that
the plaintiff may have had a viable failure-to-warn claim had the medication in
question been available to the public generally.24 However, because the plaintiff’s
claim involved a medication that was only available with a prescription and because the manufacturer made no representations regarding the product to the consumer, the court determined that there was no basis on which to hold the
manufacturer liable.25
Shortly thereafter, the distinction between prescription and non-prescription
drugs was codified with Congress’s passing of the Durham-Humphrey Amendment
of 1951.26 The purpose of the Amendment was to prevent consumers from engag-

19. Richards, 95 N.M. at 679, 625 P.2d at 1196; see also text accompanying notes 17–19.
20. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1097 (2010).
21. Id. A manufacturer may be held directly liable to a patient if the manufacturer of the medication
failed to provide the prescribing physician with an adequate warning. Id. In order for a plaintiff to recover
against the manufacturer in a failure-to-warn claim, the learned intermediary doctrine requires that the patient
establish: (1) that the manufacturer failed to provide the physician with an adequate warning regarding the
risks associated with the use of its product; (2) that said risk was not otherwise known to the physician; (3) that
the manufacturer’s failure-to-warn was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury;
and (4) that but for the inadequate warning the physician would not have prescribed the product. Id.
22. 77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 509–10.
26. Durham Humphrey Amendment of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 353 (2000)); see also Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case
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ing in “self-diagnosis and self-administration of sophisticated and potentially harmful drugs.”27 The Amendment classified prescription drugs as being those
medications that are not safe for use except under the direct supervision of a medical practitioner, and exempted manufacturers of prescription medications from
complying with the labeling requirements imposed on manufacturers of non-prescription medications.28
By the 1960s, the concept behind the physician acting as a “learned intermediary” between the manufacturer and the patient had been widely adopted; however,
the phrase “learned intermediary doctrine,” was not coined until the 1967 opinion,
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish.29 In Sterling, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a failure-to-warn claim in the prescription drug context by examining
the extent of a prescription drug manufacturer’s duty to warn.30 In so doing, the
court held that a manufacturer’s duty to warn of the risks associated with the use
of its product extends only to the physician, as the physician functions as a
“learned intermediary” between the pharmaceutical company and the patient.31
B. History of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in New Mexico
Although the rationale behind the learned intermediary doctrine emerged in
1948, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not address the concept of the learned
intermediary doctrine until its 1974 case, Hines v. St. Joseph’s Hospital. There, the
plaintiff filed strict liability and negligence claims against St. Joseph’s Hospital,
asserting that she had contracted serum hepatitis when the hospital’s blood bank,
Blood Services, used blood containing the serum hepatitis virus during the course
of her blood transfusions at St. Joseph’s Hospital.32 Hines further asserted that
Blood Services had failed to warn her that there was a risk of contracting hepatitis
associated with blood transfusions.33 The court determined that the blood used for
blood transfusions was to be classified as a prescription drug and noted that, although New Mexico had adopted the doctrine of strict liability, prescription drugs
were unavoidably unsafe products and fell within an exception to New Mexico’s
strict liability jurisprudence.34 On this basis, the court held that the manufacturers
and sellers of prescription drugs are not strictly liable for the resulting harm if the

for Drug Company Liability without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 656–57 (2007); Charles J. Walsh
et al., The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
821, 827 (1996).
27. Walsh et al., supra note 26, at 827.
28. Poser, supra note 26, at 658; see also Walsh et al., supra note 26, at 827.
29. 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1965) (“The sole issue [in a pharmaceutical failure-to-warn claim is]
whether [the manufacturer] negligently failed to make reasonable efforts to warn [the patient’s] doctors. If
[the manufacturer] did so fail, it is liable regardless of anything the doctors may or may not have done. If it did
not so fail, then it is not liable for the [patient’s] injury.”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Hines v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 764, 527 P.2d 1075,1076 (Ct. App. 1974).
33. Id. at 765, 527 P.2d at 1077.
34. Id. at 764–65, 527 P.2d at 1076–77 (stating that the unavoidably unsafe product exception to the
general strict liability doctrine recognizes that although there are situations in which certain products cannot
be made safe for their intended or ordinary use, such products are not to be deemed defective or unreasonably
dangerous due to the potential benefit such products provide).

R
R
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drug has been properly prepared and has been distributed with appropriate
warnings.35
In examining the public policy basis for preventing liability from attaching to
sellers and manufacturers of prescription drugs, the court determined that because
sellers and manufacturers of prescription drugs have provided the public with a
useful product, they should not be held strictly liable for the unintended consequences associated with the use of that product.36 In reaching its conclusion, the
court employed the learned intermediary doctrine in its analysis, and held that
Blood Services’s duty to warn of the dangers of using the blood was to the attending physician, not the patient.37 The New Mexico Court of Appeals, therefore, refused to recognize Hines’ failure-to-warn claim and determined that Hines was
unable to recover from either St. Joseph’s Hospital or Blood Services as neither
party had a duty to warn Hines of the risks associated with use of the blood.38
Shortly thereafter, the New Mexico Court of Appeals shed more light on a manufacturer’s liability in the prescription drug context. In Richards v. Upjohn Co., the
court held that “a drug manufacturer has a duty to warn the medical profession of
the dangers [associated with the use] of its drugs [that] it knew or should have
known to exist.”39 If a manufacturer is determined to have breached that duty,
then a manufacturer can be held liable to a patient for the injuries stemming from
that breach.40 Based on this rationale, the court held that a manufacturer cannot be
held directly liable to a patient for harm resulting from a physician’s failure-towarn so long as the manufacturer provided the doctor with an adequate warning.41
The New Mexico Court of Appeals again employed the reasoning behind the
learned intermediary doctrine in the 1983 opinion, Perfetti v. McGhan Medical,
where it addressed whether the manufacturer’s duty to warn was owed to the
plaintiff or to the physician.42 Again, the court concluded that when “[a] manufacturer of a product . . . which is obtainable only through the services of a physician”
provides an adequate warning to the physician, it “need not warn the patient as
well.”43 This holding reaffirmed the principle in Richards, by reiterating that once
the manufacturer has provided the physician with an adequate warning, it is the
physician who has the duty to warn the patient of the risks associated with the
medication as the physician is better able to consider the dangerous “propensities
of the product and the susceptibilities of the patient.”44 Thus, by the mid-1980s it
was clear that, although never explicitly addressed by name, the learned intermediary doctrine was fully entrenched within New Mexico’s jurisprudence.

35. Id. at 765, 527 P.2d at 1077.
36. See id.
37. See id. The court then determined that Blood Services had fulfilled its duty to warn by placing a
warning directly on the container of blood and by “constantly distribut[ing] an Official Circular of Instructions
for Use to the hospital staff.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. See id.
39. 95 N.M. 675, 678, 625 P.2d 1192, 1195 (Ct. App. 1980) (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 678–79, 625 P.2d at 1195–96.
41. See id. at 679–81, 625 P.2d at 1196–98. For a discussion of when a manufacturer may be held directly liable to a patient, see supra note 21.
42. 99 N.M. 645, 650, 662 P.2d 646, 649 (Ct. App. 1983).
43. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
44. Id. at 658, 662 P.2d at 657.

R
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II. REJECTING THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE:
RIMBERT V. ELI LILLY & CO.
At the time the Federal District Court of New Mexico rendered its decision in
Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., the New Mexico Court of Appeals had not examined
the status of the learned intermediary doctrine since its 1984 opinion, Serna v.
Roche Laboratories.45 Thus, in Rimbert, when Eli Lilly pled the learned intermediary doctrine as an affirmative defense to Mark Rimbert’s claim, the Federal District Court of New Mexico had to examine an issue of New Mexico state law that
had not been addressed in over twenty years.46
In an effort to convince the Rimbert court that the learned intermediary doctrine was the law in New Mexico, Eli Lilly directed the court’s attention to Serna v.
Roche Laboratories.47 In Serna, the New Mexico Court of Appeals employed the
language of the learned intermediary doctrine and held, “[w]here the product is a
prescription drug, the manufacturer’s duty to warn is fulfilled if it warns the physician, not the patient.”48 Eli Lilly asserted that, pursuant to Serna, it had no legal
duty to directly warn Gilbert of the risks associated with the use of its product.49
Eli Lilly, therefore, asserted that pursuant to the learned intermediary doctrine, it
had fulfilled its legal duty to warn by providing warnings in both the Prozac package insert and in the Physician’s Desk Reference.50
Rimbert, on the other hand, contended that Eli Lilly’s reliance on the learned
intermediary doctrine was misplaced, as Serna, the principal case on which Eli
Lilly relied, never mentioned the learned intermediary doctrine by name and
therefore failed to demonstrate that New Mexico had explicitly adopted the
learned intermediary doctrine.51 Rimbert further asserted that because the law surrounding the learned intermediary doctrine was unclear, the court must either
render a prediction as to whether the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the
learned intermediary doctrine, or certify the question regarding the learned intermediary doctrine to the New Mexico Supreme Court.52 Rimbert contended that by
certifying the issue to the New Mexico Supreme Court, New Mexico would finally
have a “definitive authoritative answer” as to whether the learned intermediary
doctrine was currently the law in New Mexico.53 Eli Lilly opposed the motion for
certification and again asserted that the opinions from the New Mexico Court of

45. 101 N.M. 522, 684 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1984). The New Mexico Court of Appeals again stated its
position that when the product in question “is a prescription drug, the manufacturer’s duty to warn is fulfilled
if it warns the physician, not the patient.” Id. at 527, 684 P.2d at 1189 (citation omitted).
46. Defendant Eli Lilly & Co.’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 14, Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577
F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D.N.M. 2008) (No. CIV-06-0874), 2006 WL 6069043; Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1175.
47. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1186 (referencing Serna, 101 N.M. 522, 684 P.2d 1187; Perfetti v.
McGhan Med., 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1983); Hines v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 527 P.2d
1075 (Ct. App. 1974)).
48. Serna, 101 N.M. at 524, 684 P.2d at 1189.
49. See id.
50. Defendant Eli Lilly & Co.’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on all
Claims, Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (No. CIV-06-0874), 2008 WL 4487043.
51. Plaintiff’s Response Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on all Claims at 20, Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (No. CIV-06-0874), 2008 WL 4487044.
52. See Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
53. Id.
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Appeals demonstrated New Mexico’s acceptance of the learned intermediary
doctrine.54
The court denied Rimbert’s motion for certification.55 In so doing, the court
held that that under the doctrine of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, when a federal
court’s jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship, the federal court’s task is not to
substitute its judgment for the state’s supreme court, but is rather to simply ascertain and apply the state’s law.56
[When attempting to ascertain and apply the state’s law] the court must
follow the most recent decision of the state’s highest court. . . . Where no
controlling state decision exists, the federal court must attempt to predict
what the state’s highest court would do [if confronted with the issue]. . . .
In doing so, [the court] may seek guidance from decisions rendered by
lower courts in the relevant state, . . . appellate decisions in other states,
. . . and the general weight and trend of authority in the relevant area of
law. . . . Ultimately, however, the Court’s task is to predict what the state
supreme court would do.57

The Rimbert court, therefore, determined that its primary task was to “predict
what the state supreme court would do” if presented with the issue today.58
In an effort to predict what the New Mexico Supreme Court would do if confronted with the question regarding New Mexico’s adoption of the learned intermediary doctrine, the court examined the history of the learned intermediary
doctrine within the state.59 The court recognized that the New Mexico Court of
Appeals had employed the learned intermediary doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s,
but concluded there was “convincing evidence” to suggest that if presented with
the issue today, the New Mexico Supreme Court would decline to follow the New
Mexico Court of Appeals precedent and would reject the learned intermediary
doctrine.60
This holding was based, in part, on the Rimbert court’s conclusion that the
learned intermediary doctrine was “fundamentally inconsistent with [the] strictliability jurisprudence” expressed in the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 1995 case,
Brooks v. Beech Aircraft.61 In Brooks, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained

54. Defendant Eli Lilly & Co.’s Reply in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims
at 9–10, Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (No. CIV-06-0874), 2008 WL 4329182.
55. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (stating that “under such circumstances, certification of a question
concerning New Mexico’s recognition of the learned intermediary doctrine would not be justified or appropriate under NMRA [sic] Rule 12-607(A)(1)”); see also id. at 1189 (“Pursuant to N.M.S.A. 1978, § 39-7-4, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico may answer questions [certified by the federal district court] if they involve
propositions of New Mexico law that may be determinative of the matter before the certifying court and there
are no controlling precedents from New Mexico appellate courts.”).
56. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Stoner
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940)).
57. Id. at 1188 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 1190 (citing Wade v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657, 665–66 (10th Cir. 2007)).
59. Id. at 1214.
60. Id. For the author’s summary of the doctrine in New Mexico, see discussion supra Part I.B. For a
discussion of the Rimbert court’s rejection of the justifications offered in support of the learned intermediary
doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 68–84.
61. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d. at 1215.

R
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the rationale behind its decision to adopt a strict products liability approach when
it held:
[A]lthough [a] manufacturer has provided a valuable service by supplying
the public with a product that it wants or needs, it is more fair that the cost
of an unreasonable risk of harm lie with the product . . . manufacturer than
it is to visit the entire loss upon the often unsuspecting consumer who has
relied upon the expertise of the manufacturer when selecting the injuryproducing product.62

The court interpreted Brooks as an indication of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
desire to ensure that the risk of loss for injuries resulting from defective products is
borne by the suppliers, as well as a desire to ensure that “plaintiffs [who are] injured by . . . unreasonably dangerous product[s] are compensated for their injuries.”63 This interpretation led to the court’s conclusion that the New Mexico
Supreme Court would likely apply the Brooks products liability rationale to the
prescription drug context, as by allowing “drug manufacturers to shift the burden
of [a] defective product to physicians would undermine the Supreme Court of New
Mexico’s conclusion that the burden should be on the manufacturer” upon whose
expertise the consumer and physician have relied.64 The court, therefore, read
Brooks as having foreshadowed the rejection of the learned intermediary
doctrine.65
After surmising that the New Mexico Supreme Court would likely reject the
learned intermediary doctrine, the court directed its attention to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals case, State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, in
which the court examined the primary justifications for adopting the learned intermediary doctrine and determined them to be “largely outdated and
unpersuasive.”66
The Rimbert court then employed the same justifications as applied in Johnson
in an attempt to demonstrate that the New Mexico Supreme Court would hold the
learned intermediary doctrine to be “fundamentally inconsistent with [New Mexico’s] strict liability jurisprudence.”67
62. Id. at 1216 (quoting Brooks v. Beech Aircraft, 120 N.M. 372, 375–76, 902 P.2d 54, 57–58 (1995)).
63. Id. at 1215.
64. Id. at 1217.
65. Id. at 1225.
66. Id. at 1217 (quoting State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 906 (W. Va.
2007)). For further discussion of the Johnson case, see Victor E. Schwartz et al., West Virginia as a Judicial
Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 781 (2009) (noting that West
Virginia is the only state to have formally rejected the learned intermediary doctrine).
67. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1215–21; The Johnson court examined the following five justifications
for having the duty to warn fall on the physician rather than on the manufacturer:
(1) the difficulty manufacturers would encounter in attempting to provide warnings to the
ultimate users of prescription drugs; (2) patients’ reliance on their treating physicians’ judgment in selecting appropriate prescription drugs; (3) the fact that it is the physicians who
exercise their professional judgment in selecting appropriate drugs; (4) the belief that physicians are in the best position to provide appropriate warnings to their patients; and (5) the
concern that direct warnings to ultimate users would interfere with doctor/patient
relationships.
Johnson, 647 S.E.2d at 905. The Rimbert court also cited Brooks v. Beech Aircraft, 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54
(1995), to support its position that: “[a]llowing drug manufacturers to shift the burden of defective product to
physicians would undermine the Supreme Court of New Mexico’s conclusion that the burden should be on the
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In applying the justifications in Johnson, the Rimbert court first concluded that
the potential difficulty in providing warnings to the ultimate consumer was not a
legitimate concern that would result in the New Mexico Supreme Court adopting
the learned intermediary doctrine.68 The court pointed to direct-to-consumer advertising which allows the manufacturer to communicate with the ultimate user as
the basis for this rejection.69 In so doing, the court concluded that direct-to-consumer advertising allows for manufacturers to communicate with consumers for
the purpose of increasing “their market share by making their product well known
to both patients and physicians,” and that such communication “generates a corresponding duty” that requires manufacturers to directly warn the ultimate users of
potential defects or dangers associated with their products.70
Moreover, the Rimbert court found that a patient’s reliance on a physician’s
judgment in selecting an appropriate prescription medication had no bearing on
whether the patient should be provided with an adequate warning from the drug
manufacturer.71 The Rimbert court reasoned that because a drug does not react
exactly the same way in all individuals, physicians must rely on their patients to
inform them as to how they are reacting to the prescribed medication.72 Therefore,
the court concluded that having manufacturers provide warnings directly to the
consumer would result in more “informed consumer[s who would be more] likely
to ask the physician more questions . . . [which] may [actually] increase [patients’]
reliance [on physicians].”73 Based on this line of reasoning, the Rimbert court concluded that the physician-patient relationship would not be adversely affected, but
rather may be improved, by requiring that manufacturers provide warnings to both
the consumers and the physicians.74
The court then addressed the assumption that because physicians exercise their
professional judgment in the selection of the patients’ medications, they automatically assume the role of a “learned intermediary,” thus meriting the application of
the doctrine. In its evaluation of this justification, the Rimbert court held that a
“refusal to adopt the learned intermediary doctrine does not impact adversely the
exercise of [a physician’s] professional judgment in any way.”75 The Rimbert court
determined that a “better informed [patient would] likely . . . help, not hinder, the
doctors’ exercise of their professional judgment,” because physicians would likely
be forced to better articulate and justify their prescribing choices.76
The court then addressed the assumption that the physician, not the manufacturer, is the party that is best equipped to warn a patient regarding the possible
risks associated with a medication.77 Like the Johnson court, the Rimbert court was
skeptical as to whether physicians are in the best position to provide warnings to
manufacturer, upon whose ‘expertise’ an ‘often unsuspected consumer’ has relied in ‘selecting the injury-producing product.’” Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
68. Id. at 1218–19.
69. Id. at 1218.
70. Id. at 1219 (citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1220.
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their patients, as it is the manufacturers that are able to access the “research and
developmental history” of a particular medication.78 The court further noted that
because managed care has reduced the amount of time that physicians are able to
spend with each patient, physicians have less time to inform patients of the risks
and benefits of a drug.79 Ultimately, the court concluded that because the “role of
the private physician [has become] one of passive reliance on the manufacturer,”
physicians should not bear the sole responsibility of providing patients with adequate warnings.80
In concluding its analysis of the Johnson factors, the Rimbert court rejected the
assertion that the doctor-patient relationship would be jeopardized by having a
manufacturer directly warn the ultimate consumer. In so doing, the court reasoned
that by providing patients with more information, patients would be better informed, and such would result in more meaningful doctor-patient relationships, as
patients would be able to ask more informed questions.81 The Rimbert court then
concluded that the New Mexico Supreme Court would not adopt the learned intermediary doctrine based on the “speculative fear” that such communications would
damage doctor-patient relationships.82
After examining the possible justifications for adopting the learned intermediary doctrine, the Rimbert court concluded that a patient’s reliance on a physician
as a “learned intermediary” is not the same as it was in the 1970s and 1980s.83 Thus,
the Rimbert court predicted that, based on the “erosion of the justifications for
adoption” and New Mexico’s strict liability jurisprudence, there was convincing
evidence to suggest that the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the learned
intermediary doctrine.84
III. RIMBERT’S INTERPRETATION OF NEW MEXICO’S
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
As Part I.B of this note demonstrated, a straightforward reading of the New
Mexico Court of Appeals’ precedent indicates that at the time that the Federal
District Court of New Mexico laid down its decision in Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
the substance of the learned intermediary doctrine was entrenched within New
Mexico’s jurisprudence. This raises the question as to how, in light of the New
Mexico Court of Appeals’ precedent, the Rimbert court could have concluded that
the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the learned intermediary doctrine
and hold the doctrine to be outdated. In attempting to understand the court’s prediction in Rimbert, it is important to first understand the basis of the court’s jurisdiction and why it departed from the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ precedent.
Because in Rimbert the court’s jurisdiction rested solely on diversity of citizenship and involved a state law issue,85 the court was required to abide by the Erie

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1218.
Id.
See generally id.
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Doctrine.86 The Erie Doctrine provides that when a federal court’s jurisdiction
rests solely on diversity of citizenship, the “federal court’s task is not to reach its
own [conclusion] regarding the substance of the common law, but [is] simply to
ascertain and apply the state[’s] law” to the issue presented.87 This is not such a
difficult feat when the law governing the issue before the court is clearly settled, as
then the court’s task is merely to ascertain and apply the controlling state law to
the issue before it.88 When, however, a state’s highest court has yet to render a
decision on the particular issue before a federal court, a federal court is faced with
the much more difficult task of attempting to ascertain the current status of state
law. In attempting to decipher the status of a particular state law, a federal court
may look to decisions rendered by a state’s intermediate court for guidance.89
In looking to New Mexico’s intermediate court for guidance, it would appear
that the Rimbert court could easily have held the learned intermediary doctrine to
be the law in New Mexico and to have issued a decision in accordance therewith.90
Had the Rimbert court reached such a conclusion, the court’s decision would have
allowed for the consistent application of New Mexico law within both branches of
the judiciary. Moreover, such a decision would have allowed for manufacturers
defending failure-to-warn claims in state and federal court to reasonably expect to
benefit from the learned intermediary doctrine.
Instead, however, since there were no controlling Supreme Court of New Mexico cases on the issue, the Rimbert court appears to have concluded the law within
New Mexico to be unsettled.91 Based on this conclusion, the Erie Doctrine provided the court with the option of engaging in abstention,92 certification,93 or pre-

86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); see also Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Federal or State Law as
Governing Federal Court’s Authority in Diversity Action after Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, to Take Judicial
Notice of Law of Sister State or Foreign Country, 7 A.L.R. FED. 921, § 2(a) (1971) (discussing the historical
evolution of the Erie Doctrine).
87. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1188 (quoting Wade v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657, 665–66 (10th
Cir. 2007)). “Substantive rules of decision . . . must come from the states.” Jed I. Bergman, Putting Precedent
in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 973 (1996).
88. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism
After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1467 (1997).
89. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
90. See supra Part I.B (discussing New Mexico Court of Appeals cases addressing the learned intermediary doctrine).
91. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 (“A lack of appellate decisions from New Mexico is not the
situation here. The problem is that there is no controlling Supreme Court of New Mexico decision.”). State law
is indeterminate when: (1) a particular legal question allows for more than one reasonable answer; (2) when a
federal court is faced with a question not addressed by the state’s highest court; (3) when the state’s lower
courts have not provided a clear answer; or (4) when the decisions governing the issue “no longer represent[ ]
the way in which the court would resolve the question today.” Clark, supra note 88, at 1468–69. “When state
law fails to provide a determinate answer to a particular legal question,” the role the federal court is supposed
to play in the application of the law is less clear and much more difficult. Id.
92. See Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) (asserting that abstention is only
appropriate in cases involving exceptional circumstances); Bergman, supra note 87, at 998 (defining abstention
as a process in which a federal court can abstain from ascertaining or predicting the state law, therefore,
leaving the issue to be addressed by the state’s highest court); Deborah J. Challener, Distinguishing Certification from Abstention in Diversity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction,
38 RUTGERS L.J. 847, 862 (1996) (discussing three categories of abstention).
93. See Bergman, supra note 87, at 1000 (stating that certification allows for the state’s highest court to
clarify the law concerning the issue before the federal court and “avoids the difficulties” created by predictive
decisions). Certification is similar to abstention in that the federal court defers the issue to the state’s highest
court; however, with certification the state’s highest court provides the basis upon which the federal court is to
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diction94 when resolving the ambiguous state law issue.95 Although the decision
regarding which course of action to take lies within the sole discretion of the court,
the ability of a state’s highest court to answer a certified question of state law is
subject to a state’s certification rules.96
Based on the procedures governing the certification process within New Mexico, the Rimbert court concluded that any attempt at certification would prove to
be fruitless as the language of both the New Mexico’s certification rule and statute
prohibited the New Mexico Supreme Court from answering any issue certified by
the federal court that involved an area of law to which New Mexico’s appellate
court had spoken.97 Although the Rimbert court noted that it would have preferred
to have obtained a definitive answer on the issue from the New Mexico Supreme
Court, it concluded that, in light of the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ decisions,
New Mexico’s certification process barred the New Mexico Supreme Court from
immediately resolving this state law issue.98 The Rimbert court then concluded that,
despite the existence of the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ decisions, the Erie
Doctrine authorized it to depart from such decisions if it found “convincing evidence” that those decisions were not an adequate reflection of the state’s law.99
Based on this interpretation of New Mexico’s certification rules, the Rimbert
court held that New Mexico’s statute and rule, coupled with the Erie Doctrine,
required that it deny Rimbert’s motion for certification and that it “divine, as
much as possible, what the Supreme Court of New Mexico would do” if presented
with the issue.100
In engaging in its “Erie analysis,” the Rimbert court inquired into whether the
New Mexico Court of Appeals cases were a “good indication of how the Supreme
Court of New Mexico would rule” if presented with the question today.101 The
court concluded that in light of New Mexico’s strict liability jurisprudence and the

reach a decision in the case. See id. The decision whether or not to certify the question to the state’s highest
court lies within the sound discretion of the federal court. See Lehman Bros. v. Shein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
94. The predictive approach allows the federal court to render a decision based on its prediction of
what the state’s highest court would do if faced with the issue. See Clark, supra note 88, at 1495.
95. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (providing the purpose of the Erie Doctrine was to
prevent forum-shopping and the “inequitable administration of the laws”). The decision regarding whether to
engage in abstention, certification, or prediction is left to the sole discretion of the federal court. See Bergman,
supra note 87, at 1000.
96. See Bergman, supra note 87, at 1000 n.193 (stating that a state court may decline to answer a
certified question of state law).
97. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1189 (D.N.M. 2008) (considering NMSA 1978,
Section 39-7-4 (1997) and Rule 12-607(A)(1)(a) NMRA). Rule 12-607 NMRA addresses the Supreme Court
of New Mexico’s ability to answer certified questions of state law and provides that the New Mexico Supreme
Court may answer a certified question of state law when there is no controlling “appellate opinion of the New
Mexico Supreme Court or the New Mexico Court of Appeals.” Rule 12-607(A)(1)(a) NMRA.
98. Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1213–14. This interpretation rests on the assumption that the New
Mexico Supreme Court is reluctant to examine issues on which its appellate courts have spoken, but that it is
comfortable with a federal judge reaching his or her own conclusions about the status of a law in New Mexico.
It is hard to imagine that the New Mexico Supreme Court would prefer to defer to a federal judge regarding
an ambiguous issue of state law, rather than address the issue itself.
99. Id. at 1222 n. 5 (quoting Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940)).
100. Id. at 1214 (considering NMSA 1978, § 39-7-4 and Rule 12-607(A)(1)(a) NMRA).
101. Id.
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outdated justifications offered in favor of the learned intermediary doctrine, the
New Mexico Supreme Court would not adopt the learned intermediary doctrine.102
By departing from the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ precedent, the Rimbert
court’s prediction created a state of ambiguity surrounding the status of the
learned intermediary doctrine in New Mexico. After Rimbert, plaintiffs and defendants may be subjected to inconsistent judgments depending on the court in
which a claim is filed. Moreover, the Rimbert court’s departure from the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ precedent has increased the chances that a plaintiff will engage in forum shopping when deciding where to file a claim. Thus, it is ironic that
the Federal District Court of New Mexico’s application of the Erie Doctrine has
created the two problems which the Erie Doctrine was designed to protect against,
forum shopping and inconsistent judgments.103
Therefore, in light of the New Mexico Court of Appeals decisions that were
directly on point and New Mexico’s rules governing certification, it appears that
the Rimbert court failed to effectuate the purpose of the Erie Doctrine and erred
in its interpretation of Rule 12-607(A)(1)(a) NMRA and NMSA 1978, Section 397-4 (1997), when it departed from the New Mexico Court of Appeals precedent
and held the New Mexico Supreme Court would reject the learned intermediary
doctrine.
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RIMBERT
The implications stemming from the Rimbert court’s decision on the future of
the learned intermediary doctrine in New Mexico are yet to be seen as the Rimbert
court’s decision lacks the power to bind future cases brought in state or federal
district court.104 Thus, the current state of ambiguity surrounding the learned intermediary doctrine in New Mexico will remain present until the New Mexico Supreme Court issues a decision regarding whether the learned intermediary
doctrine is the law in New Mexico. Moreover, as discussed next, the ambiguities
surrounding the potential effect of the Rimbert decision and the future of the
learned intermediary doctrine have created several important procedural and substantive issues.
A. Procedural Implications
The ambiguity surrounding the learned intermediary doctrine has presented patients who are looking to recover in failure-to-warn situations with a “crapshoot”
when trying to decide in which forum they should file their claims. This crapshoot
is a result of the fact that a plaintiff who files in state court will be subject to the
New Mexico Court of Appeals’ precedent and, therefore, the learned intermediary
102. Id. at 1215–17 (“[T]he Supreme Court of New Mexico also expressed a specific ‘judgment . . . that
although the manufacturer has provided a valuable service by supplying the public with a product that it wants
or needs, it is more fair that the cost of an unreasonable risk of harm lie with the product and its possibly
innocent manufacturer than it is to visit the entire loss upon the often unsuspecting consumer who has relied
upon the expertise of the manufacturer when selecting the injury-producing product.’”) (quoting Brooks v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 375–76, 902 P.2d 54, 57–58 (1995)). For a discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 68–84.
103. See supra note 95.
104. For a discussion on the precedential value of predictive decisions, see Bergman, supra note 87, at
975 n. 29, 983 n. 74.
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doctrine, while the patient who opts to file in federal court will find himself at the
mercy of the Federal District Court of New Mexico’s interpretation of the state
certification procedures and potentially its “Erie predictions” regarding the status
of the learned intermediary doctrine in New Mexico. Thus, even though the decision in Rimbert has no binding effect on the Federal District Court of New Mexico’s future Erie predictions, patients would be wise to take their chances and file
their failure-to-warn claims in federal court with the hope that the federal court
will again find the learned intermediary doctrine to be contrary to New Mexico’s
strict liability jurisprudence.
Moreover, although the prediction rendered in Rimbert does not have a binding
effect on the Federal District Court of New Mexico’s future Erie predictions, the
potential exists that a future Federal District Court of New Mexico’s Erie prediction could influence state law.105 For example, when a patient files a failure-to-warn
claim against a drug manufacturer in the Federal District Court of New Mexico,
the court will again be faced with the task of interpreting New Mexico’s certification rules. Depending on its interpretation, the federal court will either choose to
certify the issue to the New Mexico Supreme Court or to predict how the New
Mexico Supreme Court would rule if presented with the issue today.106 If the federal court concludes that certification would be improper and that the New Mexico
Supreme Court would reject the learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer
subject to that decision could then appeal that decision to the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, asserting that the federal court erred in its prediction and interpretation of New Mexico state law.
As long as the New Mexico Supreme Court does not render a definitive decision on the issue and the Tenth Circuit concludes that the Federal District Court of
New Mexico’s prediction was correct, the federal court will essentially have engaged in New Mexico state lawmaking.107 Therefore, if New Mexico’s certification
rules are continued to be interpreted as they were in Rimbert, then the New Mexico Supreme Court will continue to be deprived of the opportunity to address this
state law issue, which in turn could allow the federal court’s prediction to determine the law in New Mexico.
The potential for a New Mexico federal court decision to have broad implications within New Mexico’s state law is largely due to the fact that, in this instance,
such a decision would be beneficial to the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff is the
party benefitting from the rejection of the learned intermediary doctrine is significant as it is the plaintiff who decides whether a particular claim is filed in state or
federal court.108 Furthermore, because there is no mechanism available for a defendant to remove a case properly brought in federal court to state court, the only

105. Clark, supra note 88, at 1523 (suggesting that “[h]ow a federal court resolves an open question of
state law will affect the rights of future litigants in federal court, especially when the state courts do not
authoritatively resolve the question for a substantial period of time.”).
106. See id. at 1495 (discussing the predictive approach to resolving state law issues).
107. The predictive approach permitted by the Erie Doctrine has the potential to allow for the District
Court of New Mexico to “make and implement significant policy choices on behalf of [New Mexico] before
the state itself has adopted applicable rules [governing the issue] and without any assurance that it will do so
[in the future].” Id. at 1539–40.
108. “[V]enue statutes typically let the plaintiff choose among a number of courts in which to file his or
her claim.” See Antony Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV 167, 170 (2000).
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manner in which the New Mexico Supreme Court will be able to answer the question regarding the learned intermediary doctrine will be if a patient chooses to file
a complaint in state court, or the issue is certified to the New Mexico Supreme
Court by either the Federal District Court of New Mexico109 or the New Mexico
Court of Appeals.110
B. Substantive Implications of Rimbert and Its “Erie” Prediction
Predicting how the Supreme Court of New Mexico would rule today required
the Rimbert court to both be mindful of past decisions within New Mexico while at
the same time keeping an eye towards future trends within New Mexico law.
Therefore, determining whether the New Mexico Supreme Court would formally
adopt the learned intermediary doctrine requires examining how New Mexico
courts have traditionally addressed product liability cases involving a manufacturer’s failure-to-warn.
In the 1970s and 1980s when the New Mexico Court of Appeals was addressing
the liability of manufacturers in the context of failure-to-warn claims, it held that a
manufacturer had a non-delegable duty to warn of the risks associated with the use
of its product and, therefore, such a duty could not be discharged by a thirdparty.111 This position was articulated in First National Bank in Albuquerque v.
Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc., where the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
that:
[B]y placing goods on the market, a manufacturer represents to the public
that they are safe; and by packaging and advertising, [the manufacturer]
does everything possible to further induce that belief. The middleman, in
contrast, is no more than a conduit through which the product reaches the
ultimate user. [Therefore, a] manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid
liability by asserting his lack of direct contact with the user.112

This clearly indicates that in general product liability cases, the New Mexico Court
of Appeals intended to prohibit a manufacturer from being able to insulate itself
from liability by relying on an intermediary to inform the ultimate consumer of the
risks associated with the use of its product.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, however, indicated a contrary intention
when addressing a manufacturer’s failure-to-warn in the prescription drug context
by carving out an exception to the general principle espoused in First National
Bank, and holding that a manufacturer of prescription medications may discharge
its duty to warn by providing the doctor with an adequate warning.113 The fact that
the court treated failure-to-warn cases in the prescription drug context differently
than it treated failure-to-warn cases generally appears to be indicative of the

109. See Rule 12-607 NMRA.
110. See Rule 12-606 NMRA.
111. Compare Serna v. Roche Labs., 101 N.M. 522, 684 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1984) (employing the
learned intermediary rationale in the prescription drug context), with First Nat’l Bank in Albuquerque v. NorAm Agric. Products, Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding, generally, that a manufacturer of
products cannot delegate its duty to warn to a third party).
112. 88 N.M. 74, 87, 537 P.2d 682, 695.
113. See, e.g., Serna, 101 N.M. at 528, 684 P.2d at 1190.
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court’s intent to take a different approach to liability when the product is a prescription drug.
Based on the New Mexico judiciary’s intent to treat failure-to-warn claims in
the prescription drug context differently than a typical failure-to-warn claim, it is
not likely that the New Mexico Supreme Court would entirely abandon the
learned intermediary doctrine. There are, however, certain situations where a manufacturer’s ability to successfully assert the learned intermediary doctrine as an
affirmative defense to liability should no longer hinge solely on whether the manufacturer provided the physician with an adequate warning. Instead, when addressing whether the learned intermediary doctrine should insulate a prescription drug
manufacturer from liability in a failure-to-warn claim, the New Mexico Supreme
Court should require lower courts to determine a manufacturer’s liability on a
case-by-case basis. Such an approach would entail a court examining, in addition to
the adequacy of the warning provided to the physician, whether the manufacturer
engaged in direct-to-consumer advertising and the extent to which the manufacturer communicated with the plaintiff’s physician prior to the physician prescribing
the manufacturer’s medication.114
The rationale behind having liability attach on a case-by-case basis is the simple
principle of fairness. By rejecting a bright-line rule and examining what is fair and
just the court would be able to recognize instances where actions taken by manufacturers, prior to litigation, have triggered a duty to warn on behalf of manufacturers that cannot simply be fulfilled by providing an adequate warning to the
physician. For example, when a manufacturer intentionally communicates with a
consumer with the intent to both influence a patient’s choice in medication and
profit from that communication, it is reasonable for the court to find that that
communication gives rise to a duty to warn on behalf of the manufacturer. Moreover, such a duty can be viewed as arising from the fact that the manufacturer is
making representations regarding the medication to the consumer and in so doing
is attempting to influence the consumer’s choice in medication. Because drug manufacturers are communicating with both patients and physicians with the intent to
persuade each group to use their medications, it is neither fair nor responsible for
society to impose the duty to warn solely upon physicians. Thus, the direct communications that are occurring between manufacturers and patients should be seen as
giving rise to a duty to warn on behalf of the manufacturers.
Furthermore, when a patient asserts that he has not been adequately warned of
the risks associated with the use of a prescription medication, the court should
attempt to determine the extent to which both the manufacturer and the physician
are liable based on the relationships that exist between each party. Such an inquiry
is warranted based on the actions that drug manufacturers are taking in an effort
to influence medication selection and the effect such actions are having on patient
care. After examining the extent of the relationships between each party, the court
should determine, in light of the manufacturer’s relations with a patient or a physician, whether the manufacturer should be permitted to successfully assert the
learned intermediary doctrine as a defense to liability. Therefore, it should no

114. I believe these two factors give rise to a duty to warn as both have a direct impact on the selection
of which medication a patient consumes.
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longer be presumed that so long as a manufacturer has provided the physician with
an adequate warning that a prescription drug manufacturer will be insulated from
liability in the context of a failure-to-warn claim.
CONCLUSION
The Rimbert court’s interpretation of New Mexico’s certification procedures has
left the status of the learned intermediary doctrine in New Mexico in a state of
ambiguity. This ambiguity has created the risk that inconsistent judgments will be
rendered depending upon where a plaintiff’s complaint is filed.115 Therefore,
whether a manufacturer of prescription drugs will be able to successfully assert the
learned intermediary doctrine as a defense to a failure-to-warn claim will depend
not only on whether a plaintiff files a complaint in state or federal court, but on the
current status of New Mexico law within that branch of the judiciary. In attempting
to resolve the ambiguity surrounding whether the learned intermediary doctrine
should be available to a manufacturer as a defense to liability, a court should evaluate the extent of a manufacturer’s liability on a case-by-case basis by examining
the degree to which a manufacturer’s actions have influenced patient care.

115. The state court will be bound to follow New Mexico Court of Appeals precedent; whereas, the
federal court will be free to conduct a fresh Erie analysis on each case presented. See supra note 104.
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